KeghartHow the Erdoğan Playbook Is Being Applied in Armenia
By Armen Ayvazyan, PhD (History) and D.Sc. (Political Science), Yerevan, 12 June 2026
In anticipation of Armenia’s planned Turkification, the Civil Contract party has effectively conducted the country’s first elections “the Turkish way,” or, more precisely, “the Erdoğan way.” The totality of the facts suggests that Pashinyan’s chief advisers relied on the same political techniques that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has used over the past several decades to organize and control electoral processes in Turkey.
Below, I briefly outline the Erdoğan model of “elections,” which can be compared with the electoral system that Pashinyan is introducing in Armenia. The similarities are striking.
Over the past two decades, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has built a hybrid authoritarian system in Turkey in which elections formally continue to exist while genuine political competition has been severely restricted. According to assessments by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the electoral process has become deeply unfair due to the abuse of state resources, informational inequality, and systematic pressure on the opposition.
The following are the regime’s principal methods and some of the most characteristic examples of their application.
- Judicial Prosecution and the Elimination of Political Rivals
The judicial system is widely used to neutralize opponents considered dangerous to those in power.
- Selahattin Demirtaş (pro-Kurdish leader) has been imprisoned since 2016 on fabricated terrorism-related charges, depriving him of the opportunity to participate fully in the 2018 and 2023 election campaigns.
- Ekrem İmamoğlu (Mayor of Istanbul), one of Erdoğan’s principal political rivals, was convicted in 2022 on charges of “insulting the Supreme Electoral Council.” In 2025, he was arrested on corruption charges and effectively removed from political competition.
- “Judicial Coup” (2026) — By court order, the results of the congress of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) were annulled, and its leader, Özgür Özel, was removed from office, paving the way for the return of leadership more acceptable to the authorities.
- Annulment of Election Results and the Undermining of Local Self-Government
When the opposition wins, the authorities often resort to extraordinary measures.
- Istanbul Mayoral Election (2019) — The authorities annulled Ekrem İmamoğlu’s victory; however, he won the repeat election by an even larger margin.
- Removal of Kurdish Mayors — Following the 2019 and 2024 elections, many elected Kurdish mayors in eastern provinces were removed from office and replaced by administrators appointed by the central government (kaymakams).
- Media Blockade and the Use of Administrative Resources
- Dominant Control of the Information Space — The overwhelming majority of Turkish media outlets are under the direct or indirect influence of the government. During the 2023 election campaign, the state broadcaster TRT provided Erdoğan with hundreds of hours of airtime, while the opposition candidate received only a matter of minutes.
- Use of Extraordinary Powers — Following the constitutional amendments of 2017, Erdoğan acquired unprecedented presidential powers. The 2018 elections were conducted under a state of emergency, enabling the authorities to restrict opposition political activity and public rallies.
According to international human rights organizations, Turkey’s electoral process has become profoundly unequal because of the enormous imbalance of resources between the government and the opposition, as well as the politicization of state institutions. Pressure on the opposition intensifies particularly during election campaigns.
Thus, Erdoğan’s regime has created a system in Turkey in which elections are preserved as an institution, while the fundamental conditions for fair and equal political competition have, in practice, been destroyed.
If one compares these methods with the political reality that has taken shape in Armenia in recent years, the parallels are difficult to ignore. Here, too, criminal prosecutions of opposition figures have become a routine tool of political warfare; local self-government bodies face constant pressure; administrative resources are mobilized in the interests of the ruling party; opposition activists are subjected to mass arrests, and hundreds of their local offices are shut down on election day itself; widespread electoral irregularities and vote manipulation occur; and voters are repeatedly presented with the same false dichotomy: ‘either Pashinyan or war.’
The difference, for now, lies only in scale. Erdoğan built this system earlier and brought it to perfection, while Pashinyan appears merely to be diligently learning the lessons of the Turkish political school.
To summarize: Erdoğan’s administration has created a hybrid regime in Turkey in which elections have been preserved, but the possibility of fair political competition has been reduced almost to zero. Pashinyan is doing the same in Armenia. While loudly proclaiming his commitment to “Europe” and “European values,” he is moving not toward Europe at all, but rather… toward Turkey.
*****
Lucy Deukmejian
Keghart
Keghart
3 comments
I will have to say that I remain more impressed by Armen Ayvazyan’s academic credentials than the text of his article. Armen holds a PhD in history and a Dr. Sc. In political science. He lays down how Erdogan has built a hybrid authoritarian system in Turkey, say by removing Kurdish mayors, controlling of information sources or pace, he calls it, etc. But that is in Turkey and not in Armenia. If he expects that I hone my imagination and extrapolate it to the recent election in Armenia. I will have to tell him that there is no Kurdish mayoral issue in Armenia, nor a control of information in Armenia. He also does not make much of a case for Turkifying Armenia.
P.S. Citing my academic credentials may help me impress readers, B.S., M.S., M.S., PhD, Fellow (clinical pathology).
Thank you Armen Ayvazyan for drawing absolutely correct parallels between how Erdogan runs elections and that of Pashinyan. The latter used every lever of control in the government to suppress votes and conversely to invent, duplicate, falsify and/or force votes.
Dear Dr. Ayvazyan,
Thank you for this thought-provoking article. Your comparison between Pashinyan’s electoral practices and the hybrid authoritarian electoral model built by Erdoğan in Turkey sounds an important political warning that deserves serious consideration.
I find it especially valuable that you remind us that elections cannot be reduced to election day alone. The mere fact that elections are held does not necessarily mean that genuine democratic competition exists. The independence of the judiciary, the condition of the media, the ability of the opposition to organize, the use of state resources, and the extent to which voters are shaped by fear-based narratives are all essential components of electoral fairness. In this respect, your use of the Erdoğan model opens up an important field of discussion.
The examples you provide regarding Turkey are strong and concrete: the imprisonment of Selahattin Demirtaş, the judicial proceedings against Ekrem İmamoğlu, the removal of elected Kurdish mayors and their replacement by state-appointed administrators, the annulment of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, media inequality, and the use of administrative resources in favour of the ruling party. These examples clearly show how elections in Turkey have formally continued while the conditions of democratic competition have been deeply eroded.
However, I believe that the part of your article concerning Armenia requires the same level of concreteness. The claims that the Pashinyan government has pressured the opposition, interfered with local self-government, used administrative resources, or engaged in electoral irregularities are very serious. For this reason, identifying the specific events, dates, legal cases, institutional decisions, or election observation reports to which you refer would make your argument much stronger.
In my view, the most persuasive point in your article concerns the dilemma of “either Pashinyan or war.” This rhetoric can indeed be compared to Erdoğan’s long-standing logic of “either me or chaos.” Such a political style does not treat voters as free citizens making a rational choice, but rather as a frightened public forced to choose between catastrophe and the leader. This is one of the common features of authoritarian-populist leaders.
At the same time, I also think that the concept of “Turkification” needs further clarification. In Armenian historical memory, this term is not merely a political metaphor. It carries the heavy burden of 1915, denial, assimilation, and existential threat. Therefore, when Pashinyan’s policies are described as “Turkification,” it is important to clarify what exactly is meant by the term: authoritarianization, geopolitical dependence on Turkey, the erasure of Armenian historical memory, or the emergence of a new state mentality aligned with the Azerbaijan–Turkey axis?
In conclusion, I believe your article begins with an important question: Are the conditions of democratic competition in Armenia being eroded while elections formally continue to take place? This is a very serious question. Yet in order to answer it more convincingly, the argument would benefit from more concrete evidence regarding Armenia, clearer conceptual distinctions, and a more systematic comparative framework.
For this reason, I read your article as a strong and necessary political warning about the Pashinyan government. At the same time, I also believe that this warning needs to be expanded and supported by more detailed evidence in order to become a more solid analytical argument.