Iran as Necessity, Iran as Legacy: Reflections on Keghart’s Editorial

By Nurnisa Erismis, Denizli, Turkey, 9 June 2026

Keghart.org’s June 5, 2026 editorial, Armenia’s Election and the Iran Factor, reflects the platform’s broader editorial direction quite well. At its core, the article is less about the election itself than about a geopolitical reality: Armenia cannot afford to ignore Iran.

In my view, the editorial has both significant strengths and important limitations.

Moving Beyond a False Binary

The article’s greatest strength lies in its refusal to reduce Armenia’s political debate to the artificial choice of “Russia or Europe.” Geography is often more stubborn than ideology. People may dream of Europe, love Russia, or hate Russia, but when one looks at the map, Iran remains where it has always been. In that sense, the editorial’s reminder of Iran’s strategic importance is both timely and necessary.

One sentence forms the backbone of the article:

“Ignoring Iran means ignoring reality.”

This observation applies not only to Iran itself, but to Armenia’s broader security dilemma.

The Limits of the Editorial

A Tendency to Romanticize Iran

References to the “heroic people of Iran” and their “struggle for dignity” move the article away from political analysis and toward an emotional language of solidarity. Iran is undoubtedly an important partner for Armenia today, but that importance stems from the convergence of interests rather than from heroism.

Here, a distinction should be drawn between the Iranian people, the Iranian state, the Armenian community of Iran, and Tehran’s regional interests. What matters for Armenia is not emotional affinity but the extent to which Iran’s regional policies intersect with Armenia’s vital interests in the South Caucasus.

None of this means that Iranian policy is driven by altruism. Like all states, Iran ultimately acts according to its own interests. For that reason, Iran should neither be demonized nor romanticized.

The U.S.-U.K.-Israel Framework Is Oversimplified

The editorial argues that the West will attempt to obstruct closer Armenian-Iranian relations. There is certainly some truth in that observation. Yet the issue is not merely one of external pressure.

There are also political circles within Armenia itself that remain skeptical of closer relations with Iran. Reducing the issue solely to pressure from Washington overlooks important domestic dynamics within Yerevan.

Furthermore, the editorial’s statement that “Europe offers legitimacy” is itself open to debate. Europe provides diplomatic visibility but no security guarantees. As the 2020 war and the depopulation of Artsakh demonstrated, normative support has not translated into meaningful protection.

The Criticism of Pashinyan Could Have Gone Further

As reflected in many of the reader comments beneath the article, the editorial largely avoids discussing Pashinyan’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies, pressure on political opponents, recent actions directed against the Church, and the growing politicization of state institutions.

The concluding recommendation that Pashinyan should “overcome his insecurity and work with those who disagree with him” may be reasonable. However, for many Armenians, the issue is no longer one of personal insecurity but of a broader crisis affecting the political system itself.

The Criticism of the Opposition Is Justified but Incomplete

The fragmentation of the opposition is undoubtedly a serious problem. Yet the editorial explains this weakness primarily through ego and external manipulation.

The reality appears more complex. The opposition faces a deeper crisis: strategic disorientation after the defeat in Artsakh, public distrust toward the former ruling elite, dependence on Russia, and the failure to articulate a genuinely new political vision.

Without addressing these factors, it is difficult to fully explain the opposition’s weakness.

The Most Significant Omission: Historical Depth

As a student of Armenian history, what struck me most in this editorial was the absence of any discussion of the historical dimension of Armenian-Iranian relations.

In my view, this is the article’s greatest weakness. Iran is not merely a geopolitical partner of contemporary Armenia; it is one of the foundational neighbors in Armenian history.

Armenian-Iranian relations are not a matter of a few decades or a post-Soviet development. They long predate the modern Armenian Republic, the Soviet period, and even the emergence of many contemporary states in the region. They represent roughly 2,500 years of historical interaction. The Armenian and Iranian worlds have, at different times, been rivals, allies, and components of the same political structures. The Arsacid, or Arshakuni, dynasty occupies an important place in the history of both peoples. The linguistic and cultural interaction between the two worlds was so profound that some nineteenth-century European linguists mistakenly classified Armenian as an Iranian language.

During the Safavid period, Shah Abbas relocated the Armenians of Julfa to Isfahan, creating New Julfa. For centuries, Iranian Armenians played significant roles in Iran’s commerce, printing, arts, and economic life. Even today, the Armenian community of Iran remains one of the oldest and most deeply rooted Armenian communities in the Middle East.

For this reason, the editorial’s description of Iran as “a partner born of necessity” feels incomplete. The phrase creates the impression that Armenian-Iranian relations emerged only in response to Turkish and Azerbaijani pressure. Historically, however, the reality is quite different.

In Armenian collective memory, Iran is not perceived in the same way as the Ottoman Empire. Despite periods of conflict and domination, it is generally remembered as a civilization with which Armenians shared a long history of coexistence and interaction.

Perhaps the editorial could have more strongly emphasized the following idea: Armenia’s relationship with Iran is not merely a necessity imposed by geography; it is also a legacy inherited from history.

Such an approach would have placed the article’s argument on a much deeper foundation. While Iran today remains one of Armenia’s economic and strategic lifelines, the story of Armenian-Iranian relations extends far beyond Syunik, reaching back through Darius, the Arsacids, New Julfa, and the centuries-long presence of Iranian Armenians.

The Contemporary Security Question: Syunik

Historical depth matters, but so does present-day security reality.

In the current context, Iran’s importance becomes most visible in relation to Syunik. Proposals for an extraterritorial corridor through southern Armenia are not merely transportation projects. They also carry the possibility of weakening, or effectively severing, Armenia’s direct land connection with Iran.

Iran’s position on this issue is directly connected to Armenia’s strategic breathing space, since the Iranian border remains a crucial safeguard against complete encirclement by Turkey and Azerbaijan.

At the same time, Iran’s strategic importance does not mean that it can replace Russia entirely. Rather, Iran can serve as a factor that reduces Armenia’s dependence on Russia while contributing to a regional balance against Turkish-Azerbaijani pressure.

For this reason, Armenia’s Iran policy should be understood neither as a romantic friendship nor as a temporary tactical arrangement. It stands at the intersection of historical memory and contemporary security needs.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the Keghart editorial reads less as an election analysis and more as a strategic statement in favor of a stronger Armenian-Iranian relationship. In that respect, it is a courageous intervention.

Following the 2020 war, the depopulation of Artsakh, and the collapse of Russian security guarantees, Iran is increasingly viewed within Armenian political thought not as one option among many, but as an indispensable factor. Whether one welcomes this development or not, it reflects a profound shift in Armenian strategic thinking after 2020.

Yet this important observation is not sufficiently grounded in either historical context or the concrete security realities embodied by Syunik. As a result, the argument never fully reaches its potential.

The central point, in my view, is this: Armenia’s relationship with Iran is not merely a necessity imposed by geography; it is also a legacy inherited from history.

Armenia is close to Iran not because of ideology but because of geography. Governments may change and empires may collapse, but maps remain stubborn realities.

As long as Iran remains on Armenia’s southern border, every government in Yerevan will eventually have to confront the reality of Tehran.

One of humanity’s oldest habits is to ignore geography and then be punished by it. Our record in this regard is not particularly impressive.

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