KeghartBy Varouj Pogharian, Bogota, Colombia, 16 January 2026
How We Stopped Treating the Future as a Betrayal of the Past
For most of the last century, “reconciliation” has been treated as a suspect word in the Turkish–Armenian context. It was something elites whispered about in conference rooms, but not something ordinary people trusted. To most Armenians, it sounded like surrender—an invitation to forget the dead in exchange for vague promises of trade and travel. To many Turks, it sounded like an accusation—an opening wedge that would end in blame, shame, and endless legal claims. Between these two fears, the word became radioactive, and every major attempt at reconciliation failed badly. Each failure reinforced the idea that reconciliation itself was naive at best, dishonest at worst.
We are now in January 2026 and something has quietly, practically, and irreversibly changed. Reconciliation is no longer a dirty word—not because history has been settled between Armenians and Turks, but because agency has returned.
The Original Sin: TARC and the Fear of Premature Peace
The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), launched in July 2001, was the first serious post–Cold War attempt to break the ice. It was a classic “Track Two” initiative: unofficial, elite-driven, discreet, and heavily reliant on Western sponsorship—especially from the U.S. State Department. The logic was simple. Since Ankara and Yerevan had no diplomatic relations and a sealed border, civil society would have to go first.
On paper, TARC was bold. It tackled trade, culture, tourism—and most dangerously—history. By commissioning the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) to evaluate whether the events of 1915 constituted genocide under international law, TARC stepped directly into a minefield.
The ICTJ’s conclusion was devastating and clarifying at the same time: yes, the massacres met the legal definition of genocide; no, the Genocide Convention could not be applied retroactively for prosecutions or reparations.
In theory, this should have lowered the temperature. In practice, it blew the commission apart.
For Armenians, reconciliation without acknowledgment felt empty. For Turks, acknowledgment felt toxic. Both sides retreated to their corners. Diaspora Armenians condemned TARC as a smokescreen designed to derail genocide recognition by foreign parliaments. Turkish nationalists framed it as capitulation to foreign pressure. When U.S. attention shifted after September 11 toward Iraq and the necessity for Turkey’s strategic cooperation, TARC lost its last scaffolding.
The lesson many people took was the wrong one: reconciliation doesn’t work. The real lesson was harsher and more precise: reconciliation without legitimacy collapses.
Zurich: The Grand Bargain That Broke Under Its Own Weight
The 2009 Zurich Protocols tried again—this time at the state level. No more quiet commissions. A treaty was hoped to be signed under chandeliers, brokered by Switzerland, and blessed by Washington, Moscow, and Paris. The ambition was enormous: diplomatic recognition, border opening, economic cooperation, and a historical sub-commission
It was everything at once. And that was the problem.
The protocols fell into what might be called a “triple trap.” First, Nagorno-Karabakh hovered like an unspoken ghost. Although deliberately excluded from the text, it dominated reality. Azerbaijan viewed normalization as betrayal. Turkey, dependent on Azerbaijani energy and solidarity, folded almost immediately, reintroducing Karabakh as a precondition after the signing. Armenia saw this as bad faith. Trust evaporated.
Second, the historical commission enraged nearly everyone. Armenians rejected the idea that genocide required re-examination. Turks feared that even participating implied eventual admission of guilt. The commission satisfied no one.
Third, domestic law finished the job. Armenia’s Constitutional Court, while approving the protocols, clarified that nothing in them could undermine genocide recognition. Turkey seized on this as proof that Armenia was acting in bad faith. The documents sat in parliamentary drawers until Armenia finally declared them null and void in 2018.
Again, reconciliation was blamed. The real failure lay in the belief that history, borders, identity, and geopolitics could be resolved in one ceremonial stroke.
The End of the Grand Bargain Illusion
The current normalization process—still fragile, still contested—looks nothing like Zurich. There are no protocols. No grand commissions. No claims of “historic breakthroughs.” Instead, there are e-visas.
Russian border guards have begun to step back on the Armenian side, quietly and without ceremony. Third-country nationals are already permitted to cross at the Margara–Alican land border. Beginning January 1, 2026, holders of diplomatic and special passports are expected to move between Turkey and Armenia under simplified e-visa procedures. And, Turkey’s flagship carrier is set to add flights to Yerevan in March, supplementing existing Pegasus Airlines service from Istanbul. None of this has made big headlines. That is precisely why it is working.
The driving force is transit: railways, roads, and logistics hubs. The TRIPP project—the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity—has an awkward name, but its logic is hardnosed. Restore Soviet-era rail lines. Connect Turkey to Armenia, Armenia to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan to Central Asia. Let goods move. People will follow.
As the Karabagh conflict settles into a negotiated framework, Turkey’s long-held justification for sealing the border—solidarity with Azerbaijan—has eroded.
Cenk Uygur and Ana Kasparian
Unexpected Teachers: Ana Kasparian and Cenk Uygur
The collaboration between Ana Kasparian, an Armenian American, and Cenk Uygur, a Turkish American, on The Young Turks TV program is one of the most instructive examples of reconciliation in practice. The two didn’t erase their differences. They publicly navigated their complex personal and national histories in dialogue and debate, and grew. Their shared values outweighed their inherited national scripts.
This partnership survived because of one crucial step: Cenk’s public recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The acknowledgment was not performative. It was costly as it alienated parts of his own community. Yet, it allowed Ana to feel seen and respected, and punctured a central myth: that reconciliation requires forgetting. It doesn’t. It requires agency—the refusal to let inherited hatred be the sole author of the present.
Grassroots: Where Reconciliation Actually Lives
Reconciliation is no longer waiting for parliaments. It’s happening in Gyumri and Kars–in oral history projects, railway feasibility studies, and tourism workshops. These initiatives understand something earlier efforts missed: legitimacy grows from usefulness. When Armenians and Turks collaborate on restoring a bridge, training tourist guides, or planning passenger stops along the Kars–Gyumri railway, reconciliation stops being symbolic and starts being practical.
For much of the last century, the Armenian Diaspora acted as a necessary guardian of memory. That role is not obsolete. But it is incomplete. In 2026, the Diaspora has leverage not only through lobbying efforts, but through investment and participation—by financing a warehouse near the Gyumri rail hub or funding a fellowship that places an Armenian engineer in Kars and a Turkish doctor in Yerevan.
These acts won’t dilute justice. They anchor it in reality.
Why Reconciliation Is No Longer a Dirty Word
Reconciliation failed when it asked people to leap before the ground below was visible. It failed when it tried to solve everything at once. It failed when it was imposed.
What is happening now is different. History has not been resolved—but it has been acknowledged by enough individuals to loosen its chokehold. The past is not forgotten—but the future is no longer held hostage to it. Borders are not fully open—but they are no longer just speculative.
Reconciliation, stripped of its euphemisms, is simply this: refusing to outsource the future to the worst moment of the past. Reconciliation is no longer radical. It is practical. And at last, it seems to be working.
Elderly villagers on the borders interviewed by journalists often remember a time before borders hardened, with stories of shared meals, borrowed tools, and mutual protection. These narratives don’t erase 1915. They complicate the lie that coexistence is impossible.
The coming Armenian elections will test the new shifts. Fear remains potent. Disinformation travels faster than a jet. But the choice before us is clearer than it has ever been: frozen righteousness or sovereign engagement.
*****
Varouj Pogharian was born and raised in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. His grandparents were from 
Van, Arapkir and Urfa. His family moved to Canada when he was 18. He retired from the Canadian federal government following a career that included assignments in South America. He is currently working on a historical novel, which is set in Asia Minor during the tumultuous period that spanned the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the rise of the Young Turks. His narrative is poised to explore the complexities of this historical backdrop.
Keghart
Keghart
12 comments
Allow me to dispense with the verbal gymnastics and somersaults of logic and reach to the heart of the matter.
1. After centuries of persecution and regular massacres, Turks decided to eliminate the Armenians. They half-succeeded as they killed 1.5 million Armenians and drove the rest into exile. Armenians were also driven from their historic lands (Western Armenia) in addition to Cilicia.
2. Since then–the past one-hundred and ten years, Turkey has denied committing genocide and hasn’t paid a cent of compensation.
3. During the 70 Soviet years, Armenia was not allowed to mention the genocide, but the diaspora did effectively. Soviets also provided territorial integrity.
4. Armenia became independent and was forced to fight Turkey-backed Azerbaijan.
5. With Turkish and Israeli help, Azerbaijan bloodied Armenia several times and occupied Armenian Artsakh, in addition to occupying lands in eastern Armenia.
6. To the great glee of Azerbaijan and Turkey, southern Armenia was sliced to facilitate trade between East and West, but particularly between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
7. Armenia lost its traditional bodyguard Russia and is now naked. France “our best friend” will not send a single soldier to defend us (Turkey’s military budget is larger than that of France.)
8. Defenseless, Armenia has to accommodate Turkey and Azerbaijan. Pashinyan is trying to give a mask to what has happened. He is running around pretending Turkey/Azerbaijan are friends of Armenia. He wants to see forced amnesia in Armenia.
Rational: We will never get our lands back or receive compensation from Turkey. Armenia is 3 million while Turkey-Azerbaijan is 95 million: we can’t beat them. “Switch if you can’t lick..”
9. To help Pashinyan in his lying strategy (that Armenia is not under the thumb of Ankara), Erdogan is not throwing his weight around. HE hopes Armenia will either self-distruct or become a Turkish vassal..
10. Pashinyan supporters in the diaspora are praying Pashinyan manages things with the least embarrassment to our amour propre..
What an excellent article. All of Varouj Pogharian’s works are distinctive in their perspectives, adding a valuable new dimension to the discussion. This piece, in particular, stands out as one of his best. It is always enlightening to read his insights.
A monkey with makeup is still a monkey. Portraying Armenia’s submission to Turkish will as peace is avoidance.
The article skates by Armenia’s long opposition to the Corridor (now called TRIPP) which slices Armenia and shuffles the forced (by the U.S.) Corridor by saying the Corridor will connect Turkey to Armenia ((hail), Armenia to Azerbaijan (hail), Azerbaijan to Central Asia (hail). But how does a country welcome the slicing of its territory? How does a country welcome the slicing when it connects its two existential enemies. It’s also conceivable Turkey would transport weapons to Azerbaijan via the Corridor…weapons whose primary target would be Armenia. Instead, the article shuffles the danger with “let goods move. People will follow.” Are we to welcome terrorist Uyghurs rushing to Turkey? What about the danger that the Corridor could bypass Armenia while crossing Armenian lands.
The Kasparian-Uygur (“The Young Turks”) association as a model for Armenia-Turkey relationship doesn’t work because Uygur recognizes the Genocide of Armenians while Turkey, headed by a former footballer, doesn’t.
Burying Hye Tadd is betraying our nation, our history, and its stomping over our 1.5 million martyrs who Erdogan says were “relocated” for their protection and to “prevent collusion” with Armenian killer gangs.” The fact that 250,000 to 300,000 Armenians, including my two uncles, who volunteered to defend Turkey, is, I guess, neither here nor there.
The fancy footwork which welcomes “peace” between the two Turkish dictatorships and Armenia is not convincing. Let’s say what really happened: For seventy years, Turkey didn’t attack Armenia because we had the Soviet shield. Post-Soviet Union, Russia betrayed Armenia rendering Armenia defenseless. Unable to find a new protector, we submitted to Turkey.
See you at the Istanbul’s Grand Market or the Antalya resort.
TRIPP “corridor” was the culmination of Pashinyan’s “peace” initiatives. In reality, this noble-sounding phrase is a cover for capitulation: the loss of additional territory on which Armenia can’t claim sovereignty, with 26% of shares in the project for 48 years, and the option to carry it forward for another 50 years. I don’t understand the logic of “reconciliation” under these terms.
Levon, I share your concerns.
This is capitulation. Not peace, not repentance, not reconciliation (people had to once be close to be able to reconcile — not applicable here).
I see both sides of the argument. With the collapse of the world order, Armenia needs to claim its stake, focusing on two key factors: economy and defense. In this context, “principled pragmatism” is a valuable approach to adopt moving forward. The future shouldn’t be held back from Armenia taking advantage of the opportunities available to it—that’s the pragmatic side. On the principled side, the stronger Armenia becomes, the better it can uphold its values. Countries that embrace agility will have a greater chance of survival.
I loved Varouj’s article. To me, it is well thought of, well-versed,eloquent.
As an Armenian, I loves Armenia, I am interested about Armenia, I know some things but otherwise am ignorant. Talking is easy, walking the talk is difficult.
Allow me to address Levon’s points 3 and 7.
3. In 1965, despite Soviet Unions’ objections and the Army sent to Armenia to stop the demonstration, then the first secretary of Soviet Armenia, Zarobyan (later demoted), stopped the Army. That allowed an unprecedented hundreds of thousands to demonstrate. Thus, Soviet Armenia officially recognized the Armenian genocide.
Yes, the Soviet Union did not formally recognize the Armenian Genocide, but as of 1965, it annually allowed Soviet Armenia to officially commemorate the Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide.
7. I quote “Armenia lost its traditional bodyguard Russia and now is naked.” This was true under Soviet rule, but false after Armenia’s independence. Even though since independence Armenia officially underwrites all the expenses of the 102nd Russian military base to guard Armenia’s boarders, they never did.
My opinion: Russia gave the green light for Turkey and Azerbaijan to start the 44-day war. (Even though according to Minsk Group a third country should not have be involved.)
Russians did nothing to protect the people of Artsakh, did not stop the 10-month blockade, did not stop the evacuation of 120,000 Indigenous Armenians, their excuse, Artsakh was not officially part of Armenia. The reason, to replace Pashinyan with Putin’s cronies.
Following the 44-day war, “As of October 2025, Azerbaijani armed forces occupy at least 241.4 square kilometers of Armenia’s sovereign territory,” which is a big piece for Armenia. Even though Armenia was one of the members of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia’s and CSTO’s response: Naught! They considered as small border skirmishes. I will stop here.
I understand why reconciliation feels hollow—or even offensive—when framed against unequal negotiations and our recent losses. My opinion is not an endorsement of any specific RoA policy including the “corridor”. It is an argument that rejecting reconciliation as a concept risks locking us into permanent grievance without leverage or strategy. One can oppose capitulation, as I do, and still insist that reconciliation, properly understood, is necessary.
Varouj, Now that you have clarified your position, I agree with you.
Dear Varouj,
As I was reading this piece, I caught myself stopping more than once and thinking, yes — this is exactly the point. One of the strongest things about your essay is the way you rescue “reconciliation” from moral posturing and empty slogans and place it firmly within questions of legitimacy, agency, and political realism. Your treatment of TARC and Zurich is especially persuasive: there is no romanticizing, no easy villains, just a clear-eyed account of why these processes collapsed — not because of a lack of goodwill, but because of how they were designed.
Your critique of the “grand bargain illusion” is particularly sharp. The idea that history, borders, identity, and geopolitics could all be resolved in a single ceremonial stroke is something many people still cling to, and you show very convincingly why it was doomed to fail. I also found your framing of reconciliation — not as forgetting or surrender, but as refusing to let the darkest moment of the past be the sole author of the present — to be the conceptual heart of the essay. It’s a rare balance: defending memory without freezing the future.
I also really appreciated your approach to the diaspora question. It’s neither accusatory nor idealized. You acknowledge the indispensable role of memory while calling for participation, investment, and concrete agency. Treating reconciliation not as a moral virtue but as something that must be useful and lived makes the argument feel grounded and serious.
That said — and I’m saying this in the spirit of friendship and intellectual trust — there are a few areas where I felt the analysis could be pushed further. Turkey’s internal political reality — authoritarianism, arbitrariness, and the erosion of the rule of law — is largely absent, even though it is one of the key factors shaping both the limits and the fragility of any normalization process. Relatedly, the reversibility of this normalization — how easily it could be suspended or undone by a political rupture — could be addressed more directly.
I also wondered about the silence around the fact that economic integration does not always produce peace. The Russia–Ukraine case is an obvious reminder of this. Your emphasis on “practicality” is compelling, but acknowledging that practicality can sometimes slide into the deferral of justice would not weaken the argument — it might actually make it more robust.
I offer these thoughts not as objections, but as extensions of the space your essay opens. What makes the piece strong is precisely that it refuses easy moral comfort while also refusing cynicism. You take on a very difficult file with courage and clarity, and that alone makes the essay worth serious engagement and debate.
Nurnisa’s defense and praise of Varouj is long and requires a longer response. Nurnisa uses the fashionable yet vague word “agency.” The word has a variety of meanings: I don’t know what meaning Nurnisa has in mind.
To have agency means to be able to take action or to choose what action to take. I’d like to know what agency Pashinyan has demonstrated during his meetings with Erdogan, It seems to me when Erdogan says “jump,” Pashinyan says: “How high.”
She writes: “There is no romanticizing, no easy villains. The idea that history, borders, identity and geopolitics could all be resolved in single ceremony…” I don’t know who is romanticizing what. What’s romantic about genocide? What’s romantic about losing 90 percent of your homeland to any enemy which had been the bane of your collective lives for more than four centuries? No easy villains? I can’t think of anything as easy as picking the Turkish villains…from Tala’at to Erdogan.
Inept, if not treasonous Pashinyan policies are demonstrated every day. He has no agency. Armenia has no agency. Why the somersault of facts when Pashinyan’s prone position is visible to all. I don’t know Nurisma’s agenda. Someone working for Erdogan would express these ideas to neutralize the justified criticism of Pashinyan and send critics to sleep.